Aristotle about evil

For Aristotle, ‘actuality’ is the true good; ‘potentiality’ contains, besides the good, also the possibility of all error.

Here follows a quote from Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book Theta. In a pure thinking way he develops the idea of the perfect, of the good and, arising from this perfect, the potentiality, which bears in it the several possibilities of good and evil. It is not only an instructive piece of thinking work, it also gives, through experiencing the contents, also the remembrance of the fundamental principle of pure actuality - the foundation of our existence. What Zarathustra called 'zeruana akarena' is actuality here. This actuality cannot be found in the created things, it has to be sought for in what was there before potentiality was created. In potentiality lie the opposites as possible varieties. Actuality only knows reality, not possibility.

Actuality as the true good.

'And since in some cases it is the exercise that is final (for example, seeing in the case of sight, and nothing different in addition to this comes to be from sight), but from others there does come to be something (for example, from the building craft a house in addition to the act of building), it is nevertheless in the one case no less the end, in the other more the end than the potentiality. For the act of building is in what is being built and comes to be and is at the same time as the house. So in all the cases where what comes to be is something different in addition to the exercise, in these cases the actuality is in what is being made (for example, the act of building is in what is being built, and the act of weaving is in what is being woven, and likewise too in other cases, and generally the change is in what is being changed); while in all the other cases where there is no other product in addition to the actuality, the actuality is in them (for example, seeing in the one seeing and contemplation in the one contemplating and living in the soul, which is why flourishing is also; for it is a kind of living). So it is evident that the substance and the form are actuality. Indeed, in accordance with this argument it is evident that actuality is prior in substance to potentiality, and, as we said, one actuality always precedes another in time until that which is primarily bringing about change in each case. But indeed actuality is prior in a more proper way too. For eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and nothing eternal is potentially. Here is the reason. Every potentiality is at the same time for the contradictory; for while what is not capable of obtaining cannot obtain in anything, everything that is capable can fail to act. So what is capable of being can both be and not be; so the same thing is capable both of being and of not being. And what is capable of not being can fail to be; and what can fail to be is perishable, either without qualification or in that way in which it is said that it can fail to be, either in respect of place or in respect of quantity or quality; and without qualification is in respect of substance. So nothing that is imperishable without qualification is potentially without qualification (but nothing prevents its being so in a certain respect, for example, in respect of quality or location); so all [eternal things] are in actuality; and nor are any of the things which are of necessity [potentially] (and yet these are primary; for if these were not, nothing would be); nor then is change [potentially] if any change is eternal; nor if there is something eternally changed is it changed in accordance with potentiality except for from-where and to-where (for nothing prevents there being a matter for this). That is why the sun and the stars and the entire heaven are always acting, and there is no fear that they may stop at some time, which those who investigate nature fear. Nor do they get tired in doing this; for the change for them does not concern a potentiality for the contradictory, as it does for perishable things, and so the continuity of the change is not laborious; for the cause of this is the substance which is matter and potentiality, not actuality. The things which are imperishable are also imitated by things which are in change, for example, earth and fire. For these too are 30 always acting; for they have change both per se and in themselves. But the other potentialities, from what has been determined concerning them, are all for the contradictory; for what is capable of bringing about change in a certain way is capable also of not bringing about change in this way, at any rate in all the cases which are in accordance with reason; and one and the same non-rational [capacity] will be for the contradictory by being and not being present. So if there are some natures or substances such as people in the arguments say the Ideas are, there will be something much more knowing than knowledge itself, and much more changing than change; for these are actualities to a higher degree, and those are potentialities for them. Therefore that actuality is prior both to potentiality and to every origin of change is evident.
 
CHAPTER 9
That the actuality is also better and more valuable than the good potentiality is clear from the following. For in the case of those  things which are said in accordance with being capable, the same thing is capable of opposites, for example, the same thing which is said to be capable of being healthy is also capable of being diseased, and at the same time. For the same capacity is for being healthy and for being ill, and for remaining at rest and for being changed, and for building and for demolishing, and for being built and for collapsing. So being capable of opposites obtains at the same  time; but the opposites obtaining at the same time is impossible, and it is impossible for the actualities to obtain at the same time (for example, being healthy and being ill); so that it is necessary for the good to be one of these two, but being capable is in the same way both or neither; so the actuality is better. It is necessary  also in the case of bad things for the end and the actuality to be worse than the potentiality; for the same thing is capable of both opposites. So it is clear that the bad is not in addition to the things; for the bad is posterior in nature to the potentiality. So neither in the things which are from the beginning nor in the eternal things is there anything either bad or defective or corrupted  (for corruption is also one of the bad things). And the constructions are discovered in actuality; for they discover them by dividing. If they had been divided they would have been evident; but as it is they are in there potentially. Why is the triangle two right angles? Because the angles around one point are equal to two right angles. So if the line parallel to the side had been drawn up, it would have been clear immediately on seeing it. Why is there universally a right angle in the semi-circle? Because if three lines are equal, the two which are the base and the one dropped straight from the centre, it is clear on seeing it to the person who knows that. So that it is evident that the things which are potentially are discovered when they are drawn out into actuality; the explanation is that thinking is the actuality; so that the potentiality is from actuality, and because of this they know by making (for the individual actuality is posterior in coming to be).


AristotleAristotle about evil by Mieke Mosmuller