Truth and falseness in the work of Aristotle
byMieke Mosmuller
16-03-2016
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Metaphysics
'Since being and not being are said on the one hand in accordance with the figures of the categories and on the other in accordance with the potentiality or actuality of these or of their opposites, and by third as what is in the most proper way true or false, and since this as regards things is as the result of their being combined or divided, so that that person speaks the truth who thinks what is divided to be divided, and what is combined to be combined, and the person whose thinking is in the opposite way to the things speaks falsely - when is there or is there not what is termed truth or falsity?
For it has to be considered what we mean by this. For it is not because of our truly thinking you to be pale that you are pale, but it is rather because you are pale that we who say this speak the truth. So, if some things are always combined and it is impossible for them to be divided, and others are always divided and it is impossible for them to be combined, and yet others can be either of the opposites, then on the one hand to be is to be combined and to be one, while on the other not to be is not to be combined but to be more; and therefore in connection with those which can be either of the opposites the same belief and the same statement come to be both false and true, and someone can at one time speak the truth and at another time speak falsely.
But in connection with those which are impossible otherwise beliefs and statements do not come to be at one time true and at another time false, but the same ones are always true and false. Then in connection with the incomposites, what is it to be or not to be and what is truth and falsity? For it is not composite in this case, so that they would be when put together and not be when separated, as it is in the case of the wood being white or the diagonal being incommensurable; nor will truth and falsity still obtain in the same way as in those cases. Rather just as truth is not the same as regards these, so too neither is to be instead there is truth or falsity in the following way, to make contact and to state is truth (for affirmation and stating are not the same), while to be ignorant is not to make contact. For it is not possible to be mistaken in connection with the what-it-is, except accidentally; and similarly too in connection with the substances which are not composite, for it is not possible to be mistaken; and all these substances are actually, not potentially, for if they were potentially they would have come to be and perished, but as it is being-itself neither comes into being nor perishes, for if it did it would come into being from something. So then, for those things which are just what it is to be something and actualities, in connection with these it is not possible to be mistaken but all that is possible is either to think them or not; but the what-it-is is investigated in connection with them, whether they are such like or not. While as regards being as correlated with truth and that not being which is correlated with falsity, there is one [case] where if it is combined [that is correlated with] truth, and if it is not combined [that is correlated with] falsity; on the other hand there is one [case] where if in fact it is, then it is thus and so; and if it is not thus and so, then it is not. Truth is to think these; and there is no falsity, nor is there any mistake, but [only] ignorance—not [however the sort of ignorance which is] like blindness. For blindness is like the case in which someone does not possess the ability to think at all.
It is also evident that in connection with the unchangeable things there is no mistake in respect of time, if one supposes [that there are] unchangeable things. For example, if one thinks that the triangle does not change, one will not think that at one time it does have two right angles but at another it does not (for in that case it would change), but [it can be that] on the one hand some [are] while on the other hand some [are] not. For example, [someone thinks that] no even numbers are prime, or [that] some are and some are not. But in the case of a single thing one in number not even this [is possible]; for he will no longer think one is and another is not, but he will speak the truth or will speak falsely [in the same way] as [in the cases in which it is] always so.'
A cherub, being of the truth, as described by Ezekiel and according to traditional Christian iconographyTruth and falseness in the work of Aristotle by Mieke Mosmuller
'Since being and not being are said on the one hand in accordance with the figures of the categories and on the other in accordance with the potentiality or actuality of these or of their opposites, and by third as what is in the most proper way true or false, and since this as regards things is as the result of their being combined or divided, so that that person speaks the truth who thinks what is divided to be divided, and what is combined to be combined, and the person whose thinking is in the opposite way to the things speaks falsely - when is there or is there not what is termed truth or falsity?
For it has to be considered what we mean by this. For it is not because of our truly thinking you to be pale that you are pale, but it is rather because you are pale that we who say this speak the truth. So, if some things are always combined and it is impossible for them to be divided, and others are always divided and it is impossible for them to be combined, and yet others can be either of the opposites, then on the one hand to be is to be combined and to be one, while on the other not to be is not to be combined but to be more; and therefore in connection with those which can be either of the opposites the same belief and the same statement come to be both false and true, and someone can at one time speak the truth and at another time speak falsely.
But in connection with those which are impossible otherwise beliefs and statements do not come to be at one time true and at another time false, but the same ones are always true and false. Then in connection with the incomposites, what is it to be or not to be and what is truth and falsity? For it is not composite in this case, so that they would be when put together and not be when separated, as it is in the case of the wood being white or the diagonal being incommensurable; nor will truth and falsity still obtain in the same way as in those cases. Rather just as truth is not the same as regards these, so too neither is to be instead there is truth or falsity in the following way, to make contact and to state is truth (for affirmation and stating are not the same), while to be ignorant is not to make contact. For it is not possible to be mistaken in connection with the what-it-is, except accidentally; and similarly too in connection with the substances which are not composite, for it is not possible to be mistaken; and all these substances are actually, not potentially, for if they were potentially they would have come to be and perished, but as it is being-itself neither comes into being nor perishes, for if it did it would come into being from something. So then, for those things which are just what it is to be something and actualities, in connection with these it is not possible to be mistaken but all that is possible is either to think them or not; but the what-it-is is investigated in connection with them, whether they are such like or not. While as regards being as correlated with truth and that not being which is correlated with falsity, there is one [case] where if it is combined [that is correlated with] truth, and if it is not combined [that is correlated with] falsity; on the other hand there is one [case] where if in fact it is, then it is thus and so; and if it is not thus and so, then it is not. Truth is to think these; and there is no falsity, nor is there any mistake, but [only] ignorance—not [however the sort of ignorance which is] like blindness. For blindness is like the case in which someone does not possess the ability to think at all.
It is also evident that in connection with the unchangeable things there is no mistake in respect of time, if one supposes [that there are] unchangeable things. For example, if one thinks that the triangle does not change, one will not think that at one time it does have two right angles but at another it does not (for in that case it would change), but [it can be that] on the one hand some [are] while on the other hand some [are] not. For example, [someone thinks that] no even numbers are prime, or [that] some are and some are not. But in the case of a single thing one in number not even this [is possible]; for he will no longer think one is and another is not, but he will speak the truth or will speak falsely [in the same way] as [in the cases in which it is] always so.'
A cherub, being of the truth, as described by Ezekiel and according to traditional Christian iconographyTruth and falseness in the work of Aristotle by Mieke Mosmuller